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Cain: Montana’s Law

MONTANA'S LAW REGARDING CONTRACTS
IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE
The purpose of this paper is to investigate and discuss the law of
Montana as it relates to contracts in restraint of trade with particular
emphasis on the application of Montana statutes and a review of all
Montana decisions in this area of the law. While the paper will deal with
contracts in restraint of trade generally, the focus of the paper will be
on covenants not to compete since the vast majority of such contracts
involve agreements of this type. The treatment of this area of the law
will not cover in any detail two factors which will always affect contracts
in restraint of trade, namely, price-fixing and monopolies. The Montana
Constitution declares an absolute prohibition on contracts which have
as their end the fixing of prices' and the implementing legislation for
that provision 2 makes contracts Which tend toward the making of a monopoly illegal. Any contract held. to: be within the purview of these provisions of the Montana law would! be unenforceable as a matter of
:law. Since the Montana decisions-in this.area are few in number, cases
from other jurisdictions. having similar statutes will be examined to
highlight problem areas not yet solved by the Montana court.
Contracts which are in restraint of trade may be defined as any
agreement by whch a person's right to do business is in any way limited
as to character, place, manner and time. 3 Such contracts can arise in a
myriad of situations as, for example, one's promise not to carry on his
trade, not to sell or buy goods except at a specified price, not to produce
specified goods, not to work as a carpenter and not to practice as a doctor
or lawyer. 4 Perhaps the key factor in determining whether a contract is
or is not in restraint of trade is competition. All contracts in restraint of
trade have as their end the elimination of competition in one form or
another and it is this factor which has traditionally bothered courts in
allowing such contracts to be strictly enforced.
The very nature of these contracts, that of elimination of competition, indicates that injunction is usually the only remedy which would
be effective to give the promisee the desired result from his contract.
In the many cases decided to date the vast majority involve an attempt
by the promisee to enjoin the proinisor from carrying on certain activities
in violation of contract terms. An additional problem which leads to
the use of the remedy of injunction is the difficulty in determining damauges for the breach of restrictive covenants. The direct effect on one's
business resulting from competition by one person would be difficult to
show and costly to determine at best.
1

MonTtana Constitutibn, Art. XV. sec: 20.
2Sec. 94-1104, REVISED CODES OF MONTANA,.1947, hereinafter cited as R.C.M.
-,Williston on Contracts. Rev. Ed., sec. 1633, hereinafter cited as Williston.
16A Cordin on Contracts, sec. 1384, hereinafter cited as Corbin.
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The fact that most promisees sought injunctions to remedy breaches
of contracts in restraint of trade brought early courts face to face with
the principal problems affecting such agreements. If the promisor is
forced to abide strictly by his contract he may very well lose his means
of earning a livelihood and become a public charge. In addition, the
public would be deprived of his services and the lack of competition
which may ensue could have the effect of driving prices up and allowing
firms to create monopolies. These possible results indicate the presence
of a strong public interest in whether or not such contracts are allowed
strict enforcement. As in other areas, e.g. wages and hours legislation,
freedom of contract has not been thought a sufficient basis on which to
sustain every contract which may restrain trade.
Early English courts considered such contracts so harmful that they
were denied enforcement altogether. 5 However, developing commerce
forced courts to take a more lenient attitude towards such agreements and
in so doing courts began to balance the social utility of such contracts
with the possible harmful effects on the promisor and the public generally
should they be strictly enforced. From totally denying enforcement English courts moved to a position of enforcing a covenant in restraint of
trade if it was limited in space and did not apply to the entire realm. 6
Increased willingness on the part of courts to inquire more fully into
possible justifications for the use of contracts in restraint of trade in
particular fact situations caused this aeneral-nartial distinction to give
way to a new theory, the now famous "rule of reason."
Thus in an early English decision the court upheld a covenant not
to compete ancillary to the lease of a bake shop which provided that the
lessor would not practice his trade for the term of the lease in the parish
where the bake shop was located.7 This important decision has been
cited as formulating for the first time the "rule of reason" by which the
validity of contracts in restraint of trade is now judged by American
courts, and which has found application in interpreting present-day antitrust legislation.8

The approach of the rule of reason takes into consideration possible
harm to the public as well as the promisor should the contract be enforced and American cases generally require, in the case of a restrictive
covenant, that it be ancillary to some other lawful transaction to be enforceableY Additional requirements imposed are that the contract or cov'Blake, Harlan

M., EMPLOYEE AGREEMENTS NOT TO ConPETE, 73 Har. L. Rev. 625,

630 (1960).
'Rogers v. Parrey, 2 Bulst. 136, 80 Engl. Rep. 1012 (K.B. 1613).

'Mitebel v. Reynolds, 1 P.Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
'Blake supra, note 5 at 628.
'Williston, see. 1639; Restatement of Contracts, sec. 515(e), hereinafter cited as Rehttps://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol30/iss2/4
2
statement.
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enant must be necessary to protect the promisee and be no more restrictive
than is absolutely necessary to insure such protection. The principal factors
which bear upon the reasonableness of the contract are the area the restriction is to cover and the length of time it is to remain in force. In both
instances the court must be impressed with the reasonableness of the
restriction if the covenant is to be strictly enforced. 10 As with other contracts, factors such as grossly inadequate consideration, duress, undue
hardship on the promisor, etc. may militate against the granting of an
injunction to enforce the contract even though the literal terms of the
restriction would allow enforcement under other circumstances."
American courts, using the test of reasonableness, grant enforcement
to contracts in restraint of trade in many different situations. Justice
Taft summarized these instances in an early American decisions, United
States v. Addyston Pipe, etc. Co.:12
(1) A covenant from the seller of property to the buyer not to
complete so as to reduce the value of the property sold.
(2)

By a retiring partner not to compete with the firm.

(3)

By a pending partner not to compete with the firm.

(4) By a buyer of property not to use the same in competition with
a business retained by the seller.
(5) By an agent, servant or assistant not to compete with his employer after termination of the employment.
Thus, except where statutes may modify the general rule, one can expect
courts to uphold contracts in restraint of trade if the promisee can demonstrate that the restriction on the promisor is necessary to protect his
enjoyment of the fruits of the contract and is narrow enough so as not
13
to unreasonably restrict the activities of the promisor.

"The reader's attention is directed to four extensive annotations discussing this problem in great detail in two connections, employee agreements not to compete after
examination of employment and employee agreements not to compete ancillary to
the transfer of a business, profession, etc. See Annot., Enforceability of covenant
against competition, ancillary to sale or other transfer of business, practice, or property, as affected by duration of restriction, 45 A.L.R.2 77, (1956) ; as affected
by territorial extent of restriction, 46 A.L.R.2 119 (1956). Enforceability of restrictive covenant, ancillary to employment contract, as affected by duration of restriction, 41 A.L.R.2 15 (1955); as affected by territorial extent of restriction,
43 A.L.R.2 94 (1955). Each of these annotations spans over two-hundred pages
and discusses the law relating to contracts in restraint of trade generally.
"Williston, sec. 1639; Restatement, see. 515 (b).
.185 F 271, affm'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1898).
"'The Restatement of Contracts in sections 513 to 518 sets out the law in this area
generally with specific examples of the types of agreements which most courts find
enforceable.
513. A bargain is in restraint of trade when its performance would limit competition in any business or restrict a promisor in the exercise of a gainful occupation.
514. A bargain in restraint of trade is illegal if the restraint is unreasonable.
515. A restraint of trade is unreasonable, in the absence of statutory authorization
social or economic
justification
if it
or dominant
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Present Montana law regarding contracts in restraint of trade
differs from the country generally due to the presence of sections 13-807,
13-808, and 13-809, Revised Codes of Montana, 1947. Since, as mentioned
before, the vast majority of reported cases involving contracts in restraint
of trade concern covenants not to compete, a reading of the above-cited
statutes will immediately indicate their obvious effect on the field of law
generally:
13-807 Any contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising
a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind, otherwise than
is provided for by the next two sections, is to that extent void.
13-808 One who sells the good will of a business may agree with the
buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business within a specified county, city, or part thereof, so long as the buyer, or any person
deriving title to the good will from him, carries on a like business
therein.
13-809 Partners may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of
the partnership, agree that none of them will carry on a similar business within the same city or town where the partnership business
has been transacted, or within a specified part thereof. 4

(a) is greater than is required for the protection of the person for whose benefit
the restraint is imposed, or
(b) imposes undue hardship upon the person restricted, or
(c)
tends to create, or has for its purpose to create, a mouopoly, or to control
prices or to limit production artificially, or
(d)
unreasonably restricts the alienation of use of anything that is a subject of
property, or
(e)
is based on a promise to refrain from competition and is not ancillary either
to a contract for the transfer of goodwill or other subject of property or to an
existing employment or contract of employment.
516. The following bargains do not impose unreasonable restraint of trade unless
effectuating, or forming part of a plan to effect, a monopoly:
(a) A bargain by the transferor of property or of a business not to compete with
the buyer in such a way as to injure the value of the property or business sold;
(b) A bargain by the buyer or lessee of property or of a business not to use it
in competition with or to the injury of the seller or lessor;
(c)
A bargain to enter into a partnership with an actual or possible competitor;
(d)
A bargain by a partner not to interfere by competition or otherwise with the
business of the partnership while it continues, or subject to reasonable limitations
after his retirement;
(e)
A bargain to deal exclusively with another;
(f) A bargain by an assistant, servant, or agent not to compete with his employer,
or principal, during the term of employment or agency, or thereafter, within such
territory and during such time as may be reasonably necessary for the protection
of the employer or principal, without imposing undue hardship on the employee or
agent.
518. Where a promise in reasonable restraint of trade has added to it a promise in
unreasonable restraint of trade, the former promise is enforceable unless the entire
agreement is part of a plan to obtain a monopoly; but if full performance of a promise indivisible in terms, would involve unreasonable restraint, the promise is illegal
and is not enforceable even for so much of the performance as would be a reasonable restraint.
4
These statutes have been extant in Montana since the Civil Code of 1895. They were
taken from the Civil Code of California and originated as sections 833-835 of the
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol30/iss2/4
Field Civil Code.
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Section 13-807 effectively eliminates employee covenants not to compete from the Montana law. 15 Courts which have been called on to construe such agreements in the light of this statute, all from other jurisdictions having the same or similar legislation, have uniformly held that
the statute means what it says and such agreements are per se void regardless of the reasonableness of the restraint or the justification therefor.16

Section 13-808 merely codifies the common law rule regarding agreements not to compete ancillary to the sale of a business with good will
involved. Courts have long recognized such covenants as necessary in order
to insure that good will is actually transferred, and that the transferor is
not permitted at some later time to effectively retrieve that which he has
sold by entering into competition with his former business in the same
location. The section indicates that the reasonableness requirement for
such a covenant not to compete will be satisfied as long as it is confined
to a specified county, city or a part of either, and is to last no longer than
a period during which the buyer, or any person deriving title to the good
will from him, carries on a "like business" within the area specified. The
statutory provisions as to time here would in all probability permit the
covenant to endure longer than would be permissible in states following
the common law rule. It is doubtful whether, after the lapse of some years
from the sale, a business would need to be protected from competition by
the seller in order to protect its good will.
Section 13-809 again codifies to a large extent the common law rule
regarding agreements not to compete ancillary to the dissolution of a
partnership. 17 The language of this section raises some problems which the
cases do not discuss, but which could cause confusion. A literal reading
of the statute would indicate that the agreement not to compete would
have to extend to all of the partners involved. If this is true it is difficult
to perceive just how such an agreement would be of any value. Why would
all the members of a partnership agree that if the partnership should
be dissolved (an event which none of them could control individually)
they would all leave town? It seems more likely that such a restrictive
covenant would be required of a new partner by firm members who were
more established or had a greater financial interest in the firm. Its
purpose would be to prevent a new partner from entering the firm, using
its facilities and good will to establish his own reputation, and then leaving the firm taking the firm's customers with him. If this situation was
envisaged by the drafters of this code section it is suggested that it can

"There are two exceptions to this general prohibition which will be discussed infra.
"See: E. S. Miller Laboratories, inc. v. Giffin, 200 Okla. 398, 194 P.2 877 (1948);
in Morris v. Harris, 127 Cal. App.2 476, 274 P.2 22, 23 (1954) the court noted that
cases from jurisdictions having no statute similar to 13-807 would be of no assistance in deternining whether or not an employee covenant not to compete would be
enforced.
7
" Williston, sec. 1644.
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not be accomplished without doing violence to the wording of the statute
as it now stands. Three states have recognized this problem and have
substituted the words "all or some of them" (or their equivalent) for
"none".' s In litigated agreements of this type (covenants not to compete
ancillary to partnership dissolutions) the decisions have often turned on
whether there was a sale of good will involved in the partnership agreement rather than whether the agreement was valid solely by reason of
being within the wording of 13-809.19 This could be explained by a reluctance on the part of both courts and counsel to become embroiled in
interpreting the literal wording of this statute.
The area limitations of 13-809 are much narrower than is the case for
the section dealing with the sale of a business and restricts the covenant
to a city or town rather than extending to a county. California has had
problems with this unexplained difference in area limitation 20 and in
1961 the California code was amended to make the space limitations the
same for both the sale of a business and the dissolution of a partnership.
Another problem area in this statute is the lack of a time limit for
the effectiveness of a covenant not to compete ancillary to the dissolution
of a partnership. Despite this lack of a time limitation the litigated cases
from both Montana and jurisdictions having similar statutes indicate
that drafters usually feel constrained to include a reasonable time limitation. 21 It seems not unreasonable to argue that since the common law is
in effect in Montana unless replaced by statute the common law limitation
on covenants not to compete, that they be limited to some reasonable time,
is still applicable despite the lack of same in section 13-809.
It seems apparent that with the exception of employee covenants not
to compete Montana courts can be expected to follow the general American
rule validating contracts in restraint of trade if they are reasonable. The
two exceptions provided to the general prohibition against contracts restraining a person from engaging in a lawful business or profession embrace an area of the law of contracts in restraint of trade in which there
is a great deal of activity if the number of reported cases are any indication. 22 In California, a state which has provisions similar to those in
Montana, 23 the following contracts which are obviously in restraint of
trade have been sustained: a covenant not to use trade secrets, a covenant

SNorth Dakota Code, see. 9-08-06 (2) ; Florida Statutes Annotated, see. 542.12 (3)
California Business and Professions Code, sec. 16602.
"See Brown et al. v. Stough, Okla., 292 P.2 176 (1956).
nAnderson Crop Dusters, Inc. v. Matley, 159 Cal. App.2 811, 324 P.2 710 (1958).
"Brown v. Stough, supra, note 19, two years; Anderson Crop Dusters v. Matley,
159 Cal. App.2 811, 324 P.2 710 (1958), five years; Jenson v. Olson, 144 Mont.
224, 395 P.2 465 (1964), nine years.
2"See generally Annot., Statutes prohibiting restraint on profession, trade, or business
as applicable to restrictions in employment or agency contracts in 3 A.L.R.2 522
(1949).
'See note 46 infra.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol30/iss2/4
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restricting the use of property sold on conditional sales contracts, a covenant limiting the use of leased property, a covenant for the exclusive
right to sell a particular product, and an agreement not to manufacture
a house trailer. 24 It is submitted that should the Montana court be presented with parallel situations it would reach similar results.
Research has disclosed seven reported cases in which the Montana
Court has ruled on the validity of a contract alleged to be in restraint of
trade or in dicta has indicated the feelings of the Montana Court towards
enforcing such agreements. The paucity of decisions will permit a brief
analysis of each.
The first mention by the Montana court of its attitude concerning
contracts in restraint of trade came in the case of Ford v. Gregson, an
1887 decision. 25 Involved there was a contract by which persons purportedly bound themselves not to sell water rights on a certain stream to
others who were trying to buy up the rights. The court found the contract
void on two grounds. The first was a provision which had as its purpose
preventing the parties from compromising or settling any litigation which
might arise concerning the water rights in question. Such a provision
was held to be against the policy of the law. The court also found the
contract void as being against public policy in that it contained a prohibition on the sale of the water rights which extended to the heirs and legal
representatives of the parties signatory to the contract. The court characterized such an agreement as analogous to a contract in restraint of
trade.
"They are against public policy and void ...A covenant in restraint
of trade generally will not be supported, although founded on a
good consideration (citing cases). It is true that a covenant not
to trade in a particular place, and for a particular itme, is good.""'

The court indicated its recognition of the general-partial distinction
characteristic of early decisions in the area, tempered by a general reluctance to accept such contracts due to the supposed harm to the public
27
from their enforcement.
In Newell v. Meyendorff28 the plaintiff had given the defendant
an exclusive sales contract for its cigars in Montana and then brought
suit for the value of cigars provided the defendant pursuant to the contract. The defendant, in recoupment, alleged a breach of the exclusive
sales contract by the plaintiff and plaintiff countered by claiming that
the contract was in restraint of trade and therefore void. The lower court

26 So. Cal. L. R. 208 (1953) and cases there cited.
Mont. 89, 14 P. 659 (1887).
2Id. at 98.
-"There is some language in the decision which indicates that counsel may have viewed
the restriction on alienation as a restraint of trade and have argued its invalidity
on that basis. Id. at 98.
219 Mont. 254, 23 P. 333 (1890).
21See,
-7'
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agreed with plaintiff and gave leave to the defendant to amend his answer.
Defendant then pleaded the contract as a complete bar on the ground that
if the contract was void plaintiff could have no recovery on it. The Supreme Court noted the general rule that contracts in restraint of trade
were void as against public policy declaring such rule to be "among our
most ancient common law inheritances". 29 The court also noted the exception granted in favor of contracts restraining trade which were limited
as to time or place, these being susceptible of enforcement. In listing the
reasons for the rule the court quoted approvingly from an early English
case and indicated their apprehension at the possible adverse effects to
both the promisor and the public in general which might arise from enforcing such contracts. 30 However, the court looked on this exclusive
selling agreement as being limited in both place and person and not having
the effect of preventing defendant from carrying on his trade or business. It was therefore not in restraint of trade and could be enforced.
Unfortunately for plaintiff, the court also held that since it had alleged
the contract to be void below it could not claim its enforceability on appeal
31
and the cause was remanded for a new trial.
In Schwanekamp v. Modern Woodmen of America32 the court upheld
a clause in a contract of insurance which purpoted to void the insurance
contract should the insured at any time engage in the sale of liquor. The
suit here was to collect death benefits under the policy and the defense
was that the insured had at one time worked as a bartender. The claimant
alleged that the clause was void in that it violated the predecessor of
13-807 and prevented the insured from engaging in a lawful occupation.
The court rejected such a contention holding that it was entirely reasonable for insurers to limit the types of occupations which their insureds
could follow. For the same reason that insurers could prevent insureds
from working with nitroglycerine and dynamite the defendant could
prevent claimant's decedent from working as a bartender by the terms
of the insurance contract. Section 13-807 had no application to this type
of contract said the court.

"Id. at 259.
10,
1(1) Such contracts injure the parties making them, because they diminish their
means of procuring livelihoods, and a competency for their families. They tempt
improvident persons, for the sake of present gain, to deprive themselves of the power

to make future acquisitions, and they expose such persons to imposition and oppression. (2) They tend to deprive the public of the services of men in the employment and capacities in which they may be most useful to the community as well
as themselves. (3) They discourage industry and enterprise, and diminish the products of ingenuity and skill. (4) They prevent competition, and enhance prices. (5)
They expose the public to all the evils of monopoly; and this especially is applicable
to wealthy companies and large corporations, who have the meanis, unless restrained
by law, to exclude rivalry, monopolize business, and engross the market. Against
evils like these, wise laws protect individuals and the public, by declaring all such
contracts void." Id. at 260.
'For a modern decision in the same vein see Thomas v. Belcher, et al., 184 Okla. 410,
87 P.2 1084 (1939).
3244 Mont. 526, 120 P. 806 (1912).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol30/iss2/4
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In a 1920 case 33 the plaintiff had sold all his shares of stock in a
corporation he had formed to transport tourists into Yellowstone Park
(plaintiff being the sole stockholder and operator of the business) to
defendants. Shortly thereafter he executed the agreement which was the
subject of this suit in favor of the defendants. In it he agreed to transfer
all his good will to the new corporation and promised not to go into business in Yellowstone Park forever. There was also a provision indicating
that compensation would be paid for his "assistance" to the new corporation and the agreement was made terminable at the will of either of the
parties to it. Some eight years later plaintiff brought the instant suit to
recover compensation allegedly due under the contract. The defense was
that the contract was void as violating what is now 13-807 and 13-808,
and that since plaintiff at the time of the agreement had no goodwill
to sell the agreement was void for lack of consideration. The court ignored
the issue of whether or not the covenant not to compete was valid by
holding that a stockholder in a corporation has no interest in the goodwill
of the corporation which he can sell and that even if he did such goodwill would pass with the sale of the stock and could not be transferred
independently as was here attempted. While not so held here, it is inferable
from this decision that an agreement not to compete ancillary to the sale
4
of stock of a corporation would not be valid in Montana under 13-808.
A suit to cancel an oil and gas lease3 5 caused the Montana court to
construe a contract between the lessee's assignee and a gas distributing
company which provided that 1/3 of all the natural gas to be used in two
Montana towns should come from the leased property for five years,
and that during this period the lessee was not to sell gas to any other
persons within the market area. Defendant urged this contract upon the
court as evidence of the fulfillment of its duty under the lease to actively
market any gas which was produced on the leased property. Plaintiff's
contention was that this agreement created a monopoly, was in restraint
of trade and was therefore void and of no effect in sustaining the defendant's clabn of performance of the lease requirements. Plaintiff relied on Article XV section 20 of the Montana Constitution and sections
10901 (94-1104) and 7559 (13-807) Revised Codes of Montana (1921).
The court rejected the idea of per se illegality of the contract under the
above provisions and quoted approvingly from an earlier Montana decision 86 to the effect that the framers of the Montana Constitution did
33Wylie v. Wylie Permanent Camping Co., 57 Mont. 115, 187 P. 279 (1920).
3"While California subscribes to this view also, Chamberlain v. Augustine, et al., 172
Cal. 285, 156 P. 479 (1916), another state with similar statutory provisions holds
that a stockholder in a corporation has a proportionate interest in the goodwill of
same which will support a covenant not to compete ancillary to the sale of the
stock. Key et al. v. Perkins, 173 Okla. 99, 46 P.2 530 (1935). Accord, Restatement,
sec. 516 (a). Such a transaction is permitted by statute in California, sec. 16601
California Business and Professions Code and in Florida, Florida Statutes Annotated
sec. 542.12 (2).
nStranalhan v. Independent Natural Gas Co., 98 Mont. 597, 41 P.2 39 (1935).
'OGreat Northern Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission, 88 Mont. 180, 293 P.
294 (1930).
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not intend by their language to void every contract which might in some
peripheral way tend toward monopoly or restraint of trade, but intended
only to forbid those contracts which "unlawfully take advantage of the
public" 7 The opinion went on to say that in each instance the court
should look closely at the facts of the particular case and the form and
nature of the arrangement or combination complained of to determine
whether the public was being unlawfully taken advantage of. 38 It is
submitted that the rule enunciated by the court in reversing the nonsuit
here is actually a restatement of the "rule of reason" so often used in
this area of the law.
In Leimav -Scott, Inc. v. Holmes" the court upheld a covenant by
the seller of a business and goodwill not to compete with the buyer in
Ilaho and Western Montana. (Emphasis supplied) The suit here was by
the seller for the purchase price and buyer defended on grounds of
breach of the covenant not to compete by the seller within the specified
territory. The lower court nonsuited the plaintiff. The Supreme Court
held the subsequent competition by the seller not to be a complete defense
but ruled that the loss of business due to such competition might be
pleaded as a counterclaim to reduce seller's recovery on the contract.
The basis of the court's holding was in part that a seller could not interfere with goodwill transferred and in part that seller had breached his
restrictive covenant not to compete. The question of the validity of that
covenant was apparently not presented to the court and they did not consider it in the opinion. It would seem that seller here could possibly have
avoided this reduction in his recovery, or at least minimized the same,
by alleging that the covenant not to compete violated section 13-808. That
section limits covenants ancillary to the sale of a business to a county
and the instant agreement extended to Idaho and Western Montana. Seller
could thus argue that he could not lawfully have been restrained from
competing in the larger area specified in the agreement, that the restrictive
covenant was void en toto, and that buyer could not base his damages on
breach of a void covenant. Courts in other jurisdictions having similar
statutes have regularly held such covenants totally invalid when they were
framed too broadly, 40 and at most have only enforced the covenant to
the extent permitted by the statute.41
The most recent Montana case in this area 42 involved a wholesale
and retail ice cream business which had been operated as a partnership.
The partnership was dissolved with each partner taking one phase of
the business and covenanting not to compete with each other in the city
'Stranahan supra, note 35 at 610-611.
"Id.
'1142 Mont. 58, 381 P.2 489 (1963).
"Dubois et al. v. Padgham, 18 Cal. App. 298, 123 P. 207 (1912);

Dusters, Inc. v. Matley, 159 Cal. App.2 811, 324 P.2 710 (1958).

Anderson Crop

"Wesley v. Chandler, 152 Okla. 22, 3 P.2 720 (1931).
,Jenson v. Olson, 144 Mont. 224, 395 P.2 465 (1964).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol30/iss2/4
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of Helena for nine years. 43 One of the partners sold his half of the
business to plaintiff with no mention of the agreement not to compete
being made in the agreement of sale. One year after the sale defendant
began competing with plaintiff's business and two years later plaintiff
brought this suit seeking damages and an injunction. The defense was
that there had been an oral agreement between the partners shortly after
the dissolution not to abide by the covenant not to compete.
The court first found the covenant valid as being within the statutory
provisions 13-807 through 13-809. Such a covenant was a contract in
restraint of trade said the court, and would be valid only in certain lines
of enterprise and only if it was a reasonable restriction on the freedom
to do business. Being confined to the city of Helena and to last nine
years these requirements were held to be satisfied. 4 4 In line with the
suggestion made supra that such agreements should contain a time limit
although the statute does not formally require one, the court seemed to
consider the length of time the covenant was to run as bearing on the
reasonableness of the restraint.
Having found the covenant valid the court turned to the question of
whether the covenant was transferred to plaintiff in the agreement of
sale without being specifically mentioned, putting him in a position to
enforce it in this action. The court cited the general rule that such covenants were assignable but rejected the idea that they would transfer
automatically on the sale of a business and its goodwill. Such a covenant
could be passed without a separate agreement if it could be shown that
it was the intent of the parties to achieve that result.45 The court felt in
the instant case that the plaintiff had no knowledge of the covenant at
the time of the sale, as evidenced by his delay in filing this suit after
commencement of competition by the defendant. This fact negated any
inference that the parties intended the covenant to pass with the agreement of sale and the court found that plaintiff had failed to prove its
case regardless of whether or not defendant could, or should be allowed
to, prove the alleged oral agreement not to abide by the covenant. The
decision for defendant was affirmed.
The few Montana decisions in this area fail to raise many of the
problems which exist. Decisions from several other jurisdictions having
the same or very similar statutory provisions are useful in predicting

"Note again that while 13-809 does not require a time limit most agreements contain one.

"Jenson supra, note 42 at 227.
4

Id. at 229.
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what the action of the Montana court would be if presented with these
46
problem areas.
A lease of real property may involve a contract in restraint of trade.
In an Oklahoma case47 the lessee of space in a shopping center obtained
a covenant in the lease that the lessor would not lease other property in
the center to stores which might carry lines of clothing in competition
with the lessee. The lessor contended here that such a covenant violated
the counterpart of 13-807. The Oklahoma court recognized that such a
contract might in some "theoretical and incidental way indirectly restrict,
trade,''48 but felt that the main purpose of the covenant was to increase
and promote trade, thus justifying the court in holding it valid. 49
Although Montana does have decisions dealing with the sale of a
business and goodwill with a covenant not to compete by the seller, many
additional problems concerning such covenants have arisen. Section 13-808
requires that these covenants be limited to such time as the buyer or a
person purchasing the goodwill from him carries oni a like business in
the restricted area. In light of this, should covenants be enforced where
there is no time limit stated for the prohibition against competition? This
question was answered in the affirmative in an Oklahoma ease which read
the time limit of the statute into the contract. 50
What result if the covenant not to compete ancillary to the sale
of a business and goodwill comes from a person other Ilhan the seller?
enforceable? Yes, said the Oklahoma court-l where it can be shown that
the covenant from the third party is necessary to the l)rotection of the

goodwill sold. Such a result however, does seem out of line with the literal
wording of see. 218 of the Oklahoma code (13-808), "One who sells . . .
may agree with the buyer

. . ."

No, said the California court in striking

down a covenant not to compete by the seller's husband in a community
property state.52 The court found the business, in which the husband
participated, to belong solely to the wife, leaving the husband with no
vendible interest in the goodwill to support his covenant not to compete.
The California court has held that where the contract is obviously
one of employment, wording in the contract attempting to show a sale
'"Similar statutes to 13-807-13-809 in other states are as follows:
California Business and Professions Code, sections 16600 through 16602.
Oklahoma Statutes, sections 217 through 219.

South Dakota Code, section 10.0706.

Florida Statutes Annotated, section 542.12.
Code of Alabama, Title 9, sections 22 through 24.
North Dakota Century Code Annotated, section 9-08-06.
'"Utica Square, Inc. v. Renberg's Inc., Okla., 390 P.2 876 (1964).

SId. at 881.
41See

'Clare

Ala.

generally, Restatement, section 516.
v. Palmer, 200 Okla. 186, 203 P.2 426
275, 17 So.2 240 (1944).

(1949).

Accord, Yost v. Patrick, 245

'Griffin v. Hunt, Okla., 268 P.2 874 (1954).
"2Balkema v. Deiches et al., 90 Cal. App.2 427, 202 P.2 1068 (1949).
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of goodwill so as to support a covenant not to compete will be overlooked
as an employee has no interest in goodwill.5 '
Can a person promising not to compete avoid his obligation by forming a corporation to carry on business? What result if the promisee has
changed the form of the purchased business from a partnership to a
corporation with a different name? A California court, in a case involving the sale of a photo finishing business and its goodwill, ruled
that the words of the statute, "like business"4 did not necessarily mean
exactly the same business or a business with the same name, but refused
to disregard the corporate entity and find that the promisor who had
formed the corporation was merely its alter ego. Thus, while the promisor
was enjoined from competing in the photo finishing business the corporation could continue to compete. 5
Courts have different views on the question of whether a covenant
not to compete will be implied from the sale of a business with its goodwill. California courts seem willing to not only imply such a covenant
from the sale of the goodwill of a business, but also to imply the sale of
goodwill in the same case from the sale of a business as a going con'
cern. f6 The Alabama 57
and North Dakota "8 courts hold the opposite
view implying neither the sale of goodwill from the sale of a business,
nor a covenant not to compete from the sale of goodwill. In support of
the California position it seems obvious that if a person buys a going
concern he intends to receive, and to pay for, its goodwill. However, it
seems a better rule to require a covenant not to compete to be specifically provided for in the contract if that is what the parties intend.
As pointed out supra the presence of section 13-807 seems to totally
invalidate covenants not to compete after the termination of employment.
Such agreements cannot be made to come within the two exceptions provided by 13-808 and 13-809. Thus, while these contracts are upheld
generally in the United States if they are reasonable,59 it would appear
the Montana employer is without legal means to protect his business
from competition by former employees whose intimate knowledge of his
operations could be effectively used to work against him. However, in
the area of trade secrets and customers lists there are several decisions
upholding clauses in employment contracts which provide that the em-

'Haas v. Hodge, 171 Cal. App.2 478, 340 P.2 632 (1959).
"Section 16601, Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code; section 13-808, R.C.M.
"It should be noted that there were others besides the promisor actively engaged in
running the corporation.
"Handyspot Co. of Northern California v. Buegeleisen, 128 Cal. App. 191, 274 P.2
938 (1954).
5
Joseph v. Hopkins, 276 Ala. 18, 158 So.2 660 (1963).
"Brottman v. Schela, 52 N.D. 137, 202 N.W. 132 (1.925); Ilyashi v. Thringer, 79 N.D.
625, 58 N.W.2 868 (1953).

"Corbin,
sec. 1394; Restatement,
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ployee shall not disclose such lists or secrets or use the same to compete
against his employer for some reasonable time after termination of employment 0°
Courts in these cases seem to have no trouble disposing of the usual
contention that such covenants prevent the promisor from engaging in
a lawful trade or business and are therefore void under the counterpart
of 13-807. The court's reasoning is usually to the effect that the promisor
is not prevented from engaging in his trade or business, but is merely
prohibited from pilfering his former employer's trade secrets or customer lists. The importance of trade secrets and customer lists to:a
business and the obvious need for the law to afford them some protection
should argue well for the upholding of similar clauses by the Montana
court should it face this situation.
Another problem arises when covenants extend to a greater territory than is permitted by the statutes or than is necessary for the promisee's protection. Will the court enforce that portion of the covenant
which is allowed by the statute or consider the covenant totally invalid
6
as being too broad? ' Courts differ on this matter, the California courts
generally take the position that the covenant is totally bad 62 while courts
in Oklahoma seem ready to enforce the portion of the restriction which
the statutes will allow. 6 3 Both courts seem ready to read the time limit
6
of the statute into contracts which are silent concerning any limit. 4
Acceptance of the concept of separability here could give rise to
one objectionable side effect. If a court will curtail the limitations of the
contract to satisfy the law there will be a tendency on the part of drafters
of such covenants to make them extremely broad for the in terrorem
effect upon the promisor. Such a tactic would in no way lessen the actual
effect of the covenant and would perhaps provide some unwarranted
benefits to the promisee. Adoption of severability thus seems contraindicated in this connection. Drafters of such covenants should be prevented
from going beyond legal limits and denying enforcement to those covenants
which do seems the surest way to achieve this end.
The fact that some contracts in restraint of trade would be enforced
in one state but not another, principally employee covenants not to corn-

'Gordon v. Wasserman, 153 Cal. App.2 328, 314 P.2 759 (1957).

Collector-salesman
not to use customers lists or disclose same for one year after termination of employment; Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal.2 690, 321 P.2 456 (1958), collector-salesman not
to use or disclose customer lists for one year after termination; State Farm Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Dempster, 174 Cal. App.2 639, 344 P.2 821 (1959), life in-

surance agents prevented from interfering with policies or policy holders for
year afer termination of agency. Also see Corbin, sec. 1394.
6t
See generally, Corbin see. 1387; Restatement see. 518.
62
Anderson Crop Dusters supra, note 40 and Dubois supra, note 40.
6
Wesley v. Chandler, 152 Okla. 22, 3 P.2 720 (1931); Hartman v. Everett,
Okla. 29, 12 P.2 543 (1932).
'"Clare v. Palmer, 201 Okla. 186, 203 P.2 426 (1949) and cases there cited.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol30/iss2/4
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pete, has naturally led to attempts on the part of drafters to provide
that contracts should be construed under the law of some state where
such covenants are enforceable. Such attempts have uniformly met with
failure. Court utilize the forum's law to declare the agreements void
notwithstanding contract provisions purporting to dictate choice of law
65
rules for the court.
CONCLUSION
While Montana eases in the area of contracts in restraint of trade
are few, the number of litigated cases arising in other jurisdictions and
the vast amount of material which has been written on the subject give
lie to the idea that restrictive clauses are not in general use in the
State of Montana. An informal survey of Montana lawyers conducted
byv the writer indicates that most lawyers contacted had some experience
with such contracts and one has had considerable activity in the area of
employee covenants not to compete during the past year. It does seem to
be true that Montana activity in this area is limited to the larger cities
and the steadily growing population of those cities would indicate that
more litigation on the subject could be expected in the future. There is
an indication that employee covenants not to compete are being used
to some extent even though lawyers are fairly certain they would be
unenforceable should litigation arise. The in terrorem effect is apparently
thought to justify inclusion of such provisions.
States other than Montana which have similar statutory treatment
of the subject report continuing lines of cases dealing with problems
in this area. These decisions should provide satisfactory guidelines for
the solution of problems arising in Montana. A survey of these decisions
does indicate two areas where the Montana law as it presently exists
should be changed.
Section 13-809, which allows the restriction of a person's exercise
of a lawful trade, profession or business ancillary to a partnership dissolution agreement, would limit the territorial extent of a valid covenant
to a city or town. The preceeding section, 13-808, limits such a covenant
ancillary to the sale of the goodwill of a business to a county. No reason
appears to justify this difference nor do the cases seem to provide any.
It is therefore suggested that section 13-809 should be amended to make
the territorial limit the same as that stated in 13-808. It has been noted
supra that California took such action to amend its provision in 1961
after the California courts had struck down several covenants ancillary
to the dissolution of partnerships which had been framed too broadly.
As indicated previously, it is submitted that the language of section

'Forney Industries, Inc. v. Andre, 246 F.Supp. 333 (D.ND 1965); Davis v. Jointless
Fire Brick Co., 300 F. 1 (9th Cir. 1924); See generally, Annot., Conflict of laws as
to validity, enforceability, and effect of ancillary restrictive covenant not to compete,
ii contracts
of employment
or for sale
of business
in 70 A.L.R.2 1292 (1960).
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13-809 as it presently reads makes little sense. Addition of language to
allow partnership dissolution agreements to extend to "some or all" of
the partners involved and including a requirement for such agreements
to include a reasonable time for their effectiveness would make the statute
workable and perhaps of some value. A considerable question exists in
the writer's mind as to whether or not allowing such restrictive covenants
has any social value in the first place. Most partnerships involve professional people or small businessmen and little reason appears why the law
should allow such covenants to be extracted (for it's hard to imagine a
promisor desiring such an agreement) from these persons as a condition
to joining a firm. The legislature has declared imsection 13-807 that the
public policy of Montana generally does not favor agreements liniting
persons in the exercise of lawful trades or businesses. The argument for
an exception in the case of partnership dissolutions seems to carry little
weight.
It is also suggested that Montana's rule concerning the interest of a
stockholder in the goodwill of a corporation as announced in Wylie is
wrong as a general proposition and limitation on 13-808. While it may
be true that the stockholder of a large public-issue corporation has no
such interest it is certainly true that the owner/operator of a small corporation, so very prevalent in Montana, may be the very personification
of the corporation's goodwill. It could in fact be the case that the public,
in dealing with the business, is unaware that a corporate entity even
exists. To hold that the seller of stock has no interest in the goodwill of
the corporation to support a covenant not to compete on the sale of the
stock is in many cases to ignore reality. It is hoped that should the Montana court face this situation again the Wylie holding, insofar as it
announces such a rule, will be disapproved and such covenants be permitted when the facts indicate that the seller of stock does in fact have
an interest in the goodwill of the corporation.
ALAN F. CAIN
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